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NOTE
USING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AS THE VESTING POINT
FOR MORAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT
Elizabeth M. Bock*
In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit confronted the novel
question of when moral rights protections vest under the Visual Artists
Rights Act. In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation,
Inc. v. Bichel, the First Circuit determined that the protections of the Visu-
al Artists Rights Act begin when a work is "created" under the Copyright
Act. This Note argues that this decision harms moral rights conceptually
and is likely to result in unpredictable and inconsistent decisions. This
Note proposes instead that these statutory protections should vest when an
artist determines that his work is complete and presents it to the public.
This standard is more consistent with the history of moral rights. Addition-
ally, public access is necessary to justify a treatment of art different from
that of other types of property, and it is a more essential component of
moral rights than an artist's feelings of connection to his work. Finally, the
legislative intent behind the Visual Artists Rights Act and the reasoning in
previous judicial decisions are more accurately reflected by a public dis-
closure standard. Utilizing "creation" as a vesting point for moral rights
is not supported by the history of the Visual Artists Rights Act and will re-
sult in uncertainty and inconsistency in future decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Port Morris, New York, is home to cranes, smokestacks, and, behind one
chain-link fence, five massive steel plates that are waiting to be assembled
into a Richard Serra sculpture.' The pieces have been sitting there for sever-
al years, waiting for their owner to call for their delivery.2 In the meantime,
people climb over the cardboard and shopping carts surrounding the work to
place magnets on the steel or just to get a closer look at it.3 Mr. Serra's asso-
ciates explained that the pieces "should not be considered a work of art at
all, and certainly not a bona fide Serra sculpture.... [A] Serra is not a Serra
until Mr. Serra says it is; this ... is a big hunk of metal behind a chain-link
fence."4 This strangely located sculpture raises the question of when a crea-
tion becomes a work of art.
This question was the central issue in the 2010 case Massachusetts Mu-
seum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Biichel.5 In 2005, the
Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art ("MASS MoCA") entered
into an agreement with Christoph Biichel, a Swiss visual artist.6 Biichel was
to construct a work entitled Training Ground for Democracy in the gallery
space of the museum's Building 5.7 The relationship between the two parties
deteriorated and Btichel ultimately abandoned work on the project.8 MASS
MoCA attempted to show Biichel's unfinished work in an exhibit about how
collaborative projects could go awry.9 The museum sued Btichel in order to
obtain a declaration allowing it to display the work, and Buchel filed a coun-
terclaim to stop the exhibition of his unfinished piece.' 0 The court was left
with the question of when a work becomes art and therefore becomes eligi-
ble for protection under the federal Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA").
Congress enacted VARA in 1990,11 codifying a moral rights regime in
the United States and granting visual artists rights apart from the economic
1. Sam Dolnick, Richard Serra Sculpture Rusts in Bronx Yard, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2010, at MB 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/nyregion/26serra.html. Rich-
ard Serra is an artist "famous for his massive steel sculptures." Id. His work was shown in a
forty-year retrospective at the Museum of Modem Art in 2007. Randy Kennedy, Sculpture
(and Nerves) of Steel, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at Al, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/arts/design/20kenn.html.
2. Dolnick, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 593 F.3d 38, 42-43 (lst Cir. 2010).
6. Biichel, 593 F3d at 42-43.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 44-46.
9. Id. at 45-46.
10. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Bichel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245,
247 (D. Mass. 2008).
11. Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, sec. 603(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006)).
[Vol. 110:153
Moral Rights Under the Visual Artists Rights Act
ones provided by copyright. 12 VARA provides artists with three rights: at-
tribution, integrity, and the ability to prevent destruction of works of
recognized stature.1 3 The statute fails to identify when a work becomes eli-
gible for VARA protection, leaving the court in Biichel with a novel
problem. The district court found that VARA did not cover unfinished works
and determined that MASS MoCA could display Bichel's work. 4 On ap-
peal, however, the First Circuit found that because VARA was part of the
federal Copyright Act, 15 the definitions of that statute controlled. 6 Accord-
ingly, the appellate court determined that since the Copyright Act "states
that a work is created when it is fixed in a copy ... for the first time" and
that "where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that
has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time,"
the work was sufficiently "created" when Buchel abandoned it.'7 The appel-
late court therefore concluded that Biichel's unfinished sculpture was
entitled to protection under VARA.' 8
This Note argues that VARA protection should not be extended to unfin-
ished works and that the definition of "creation" utilized by the Copyright
Act is not an appropriate standard for determining when works are eligible
for coverage under VARA. Instead, works should be entitled to VARA pro-
tection when the artist presents his work to the public. Part I of this Note
examines the history of moral rights and argues that public access to art has
always been an essential component of moral rights. Part II explains that
public access is more important to the framework of moral rights than the
artist's individual connection to his work. Thus it is the public's connection
to a work of art that justifies art being treated differently than other property,
and without public presentation there is no reason for art to be given prefer-
ential treatment. Part III revisits Biichel and argues that the First Circuit's
decision in that case harms moral rights both conceptually and in practice.
The Part argues that disclosure, not creation, should be the moment when
moral rights attach to a work of art. This standard is more consistent with
the underlying structure of moral rights and the legislative history of VARA.
I. THE HISTORY OF MORAL RIGHTS
This Part examines the historical development of moral rights and ar-
gues that they were initially fueled by a desire to protect the moment of
12. See infra note 19.
13. See infra Part I.
14. Biichel, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 259-60.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
16. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Btichel, 593 F.3d 38, 51 (1st
Cir. 2010).
17. Id. (ellipsis in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 56 (determining that the work "was 'fixed' within the meaning of the Copy-
right Act" and that Btichel thus "had rights in the work that were protected under VARA,
notwithstanding its unfinished state").
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public disclosure. VARA is based on the theory of moral rights,' 9 which was
developed in the nineteenth century ° and was first internationally codified
in 1928 in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works ("Berne Convention").2' Moral rights theory developed as society
began to view creative works as distinct from other property. The theory
initially concerned the right of the artist to determine when his work could
be viewed by the world. Moral rights then expanded to include other rights
besides the ability of the author to decide when he had finished his work.
Scholars began to develop a theory of moral rights in the nineteenth cen-
tury. They originally focused on whether third parties could force authors to
disclose their unpublished works and whether the work could be modified
without the author's consent or published without his name attached. 2 The-
se three concerns manifested themselves in what came to be termed the
rights of disclosure, integrity, and attribution. The right of disclosure allows
an artist to determine when his work is complete and can be shown to the
world.23 The right of integrity gives the artist the right to prevent others from
modifying his work without his permission. 24 Finally, the right of attribu-
tion-also known as the right of paternity or the right of authorship-gives
the artist the right to have his name on his work and to prevent his name
from appearing on something he did not create.25 Prior to World War I, these
rights manifested themselves in a variety of statutory provisions that varied
by country and were not conceptually unified.
26
19. The term "moral rights" derives from the French "droit moral," which is "a misno-
mer in the sense that moral rights are neither the opposite of immoral rights nor of legal
rights." Rather, they "are meant to be the opposite of economic rights." Cyrill P. Rigamonti,
Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 355 n.l 1 (2006).
20. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 67, 78 (2007) (noting that "many of the decisional rules currently associated with
the moral rights doctrine were fully recognized in the early 19th century despite the fact ...
[that] the copyright concept of moral rights, was not developed in legal theory until much
later").
21. Convention of Berne for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, 123
L.N.T.S. 233, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Berlin, Nov. 13, 1908, and at Rome, June 2, 1928. The
original Berne Convention was signed in 1886 in Switzerland. It followed the Paris Conven-
tion of 1883, which "created a framework for international protection for... [certain] kinds of
intellectual property: patents, trademarks and industrial designs." Eltjo J.H. Schrage, The Pay-
er Determines, or Does He?, in ART & LAw 200, 207 (Bert Demarsin et al. eds., Alastair Weir
trans., 2008).
22. Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 79.
23. Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists' Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 41, 52-53 (1998).
24. Id. at 50; Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and Conceptual Art and VARA,
12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209, 217 (2010) ("The right of integrity protects the dignity and
reputation of artists by prohibiting intentional or neglectful harm that leaves their physical
works of art in a state that demeans their creators.").
25. Liemer, supra note 23, at 47, 49.
26. For a discussion of the statutory approaches of different countries, see Rigamonti,
supra note 20, at 89-92.
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The evolution of moral rights-from a series of disconnected statutes,
contractual provisions, and judicial decisions into a set of cohesive legal
protections-occurred mainly as a result of theories articulated in Germany
and France. Alfred Gierke developed the concept of Personlichkeitsrecht
(right of personality) in Germany,27 while Andr6 Morillot advocated for
droit moral in France. 28 In an 1872 article, Morillot argued that creditors
could not force the publication of a work during the author's lifetime, say-
ing that only rights which could be valued in terms of money could be
claimed by creditors. 29 Morillot drew a distinction between moral and fi-
nancial rights, and redefined the right of disclosure from one based on the
idea that unpublished works didn't yet exist legally-and therefore
couldn't be claimed by creditors-to one more concerned with the au-
thor's reputation and personal investment in the work.30
Morillot, attempting to develop a complete theory of moral rights, ex-
panded his theory to encompass the rights of integrity and attribution. He
argued that all of these rights should be "under the umbrella of droit mor-
al" because each made "reference to the unifying principle that the
author's personhood. . . expressed in the work deserved respect." 3 Moril-
lot's cohesive theory departed dramatically from the earlier understanding
of moral rights as a "patchwork of ... default rules in publishing agree-
ments. '3 2 His theory was not justified by arguing that an unpublished work
didn't legally exist, but by reference to the author's decision to share the
work with the world.
Various European countries incorporated aspects of moral rights into
their legal systems, and the addition of article 6bis added moral rights to
the Berne Convention.33 In 1928, the Italian administration placed moral
rights on the agenda at the conference in Rome, and the Italian Copyright
Act became the model for article 6bis of the Berne Convention.3 4 Howev-
er, the right of disclosure was dropped from the final text of article 6bis
27. 1 FRANKLIN FELDMAN ET AL., ART LAW: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF CREATORS
AND COLLECTORS 444-45 (1986).
28. Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and
Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 595
n.363 (2006).
29. Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 100-01; see also Edward J. Damich, The Right of
Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA.
L. REV. 1, 29 (1988) (noting that Morillot argued for "complete personal sovereignty which
forbids all publication against the will of the author" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30. Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 100-01.
31. Id. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id.; see also MAREE SAINSBURY, MORAL RIGHTS AND THEIR APPLICATION IN AUS-
TRALIA 5 (2003) (explaining moral rights prior to Morillot's writings); Cheryl Swack,
Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Be-
tween France and the United States, 22 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 373 (1998)
(explaining the shift in moral rights after Morillot's theory).
33. William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 507 (1955)
(discussing the initial incorporation of article 6bis and its alterations over the years).
34. Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 113-16.
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because of common-law countries' concerns that that right could not be
reconciled with publishing agreements.35 The theory articulated in the
adoption of article 6bis was that moral rights were one half of the author's
rights in his work, the other half being the right to reproduce the work and
profit from it.3 6 Article 6bis has gone through some modifications since its
passage.37 It currently states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification
of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.38
The article thus protects the rights of attribution and the right of integ-
rity. Each country that signs onto the Berne Convention writes its own
legislation governing these rights and can supplement them with addition-
al rights.39 France, for instance, also allows for the right of disclosure, the
right of withdrawal (which allows an artist to demand the return of his
work4 °), and the right to make modifications to a work that has been with-
drawn.
41
35. See Cate Banks, Lost in Translation: A History of Moral Rights in Australian Law
1928-2000, 11 LEGAL HIST. 197, 202-03 (2007) (explaining common law opposition to moral
rights and how compromises were made in order for article 6bis to pass); Rigamonti, supra
note 20, at 117 n.242 (identifying common law countries at issue as the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, the Irish Free State, Canada, and South Africa). See generally Riga-
monti, supra note 20, at 117 (stating that common law countries find it "impossible to
reconcile the author's right of disclosure with the binding force of publishing agreements
when this right was declared inalienable in the sense that it would be available to authors re-
gardless of any assignment of their patrimonial rights to the publishers").
36. Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 109 (identifying Philipp Alfred as this view's lead
proponent, arguing that moral rights and copyright were "the expression of a single principle
... that the act of creating the work generates a relationship between the author and work that
entitles the author to exclusive protection regardless of whether the author is motivated by
patrimonial or personal interests").
37. See generally Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990:
American Artists Burned Again, 17 CARoozo L. REV. 373, 384-85 (1995) (detailing the alter-
ations to article 6bis since its initial adoption).
38. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 28, 1979,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, art. 6bis (1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
39. Id. at art. 6bis (3) ("The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this
Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.").
40. Liemer, supra note 23, at 54.
41. Ruth Redmond-Cooper, Moral Rights, in DEAR IMAGES: ART, COPYRIGHT AND
CULTURE 69, 71 (Daniel McClean & Karsten Schubert eds., 2002) (listing France's moral
rights); cf id. (discussing the United Kingdom's approach, which grants the right of attribu-
tion, the right of integrity, and the right to privacy for certain photographs and films); Schrage,
supra note 21, at 208 (discussing the Belgian and German wordings, which paraphrase the
Berne Convention's guarantees); John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet,
27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976) (discussing the moral rights regimes of Italy, Germany, and
France in comparison to the approach of the United States pre-VARA).
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The United States signed onto the Berne Convention on March 1,
198942 and passed VARA on December 1, 1990.43 VARA protections are
"narrowly define[d]" and apply only to specific kinds of visual works.a
Artists whose works meet the criteria of VARA are entitled to three types of
protection. Consistent with the Beme Convention, VARA grants artists the
right of attribution, allowing the artist to claim authorship of his work and to
"prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art
which he or she did not create. '4 6 It also grants the right of integrity, allow-
ing the artist to "prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other mod-
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation," along with the ability to prevent his or her name being attached
to a work in such an event.47 Additionally, for works of "recognized stature,"
an artist may prevent "any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of
that work."48 The United States did not incorporate the right of disclosure
into its moral rights regime.
The House Committee Report on the passage of VARA justifies the
addition of moral rights into American law in two ways. The first justification
42. Berne Convention, Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id=15 (last visited May 12, 2011);
see also Kimberly Y.W. Hoist, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the Protection of
Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 124 (2006) (ex-
plaining that "[wihen the [United States] became a party to the Berne Convention ... it did
not expressly recognize the moral rights required by Article 6bis" and that Congress justified
this by stating that existing U.S. law, such as the Copyright Act and Lanham Act, effectively
provided the rights of attribution and integrity).
43. Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
44. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 10-11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6921.
45. VARA covers works of visual art. A work of visual art is:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in
the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer
that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying
mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes
only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). VARA protections apply regardless of whether the author is the copy-
right owner. Id. § 106A(b). They also apply regardless of whether the author currently owns
the physical work. Id. § 106A(e)(2). VARA does not cover:
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base,
electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication; (ii) any
merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging ma-
terial or container ... (B) any work made for hire; or (C) any work not subject to
copyright protection ....
Id. § 101.
46. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A)-(B).
47. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
48. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
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is that the artist has a unique relationship to his work that is not captured
solely by copyright and persists after the artist has sold his work.4 9 The se-
cond is that art itself is different from other property because of its cultural
importance and is therefore entitled to additional protections." The former
justification is the one most often referenced in discussions of VARA 5I and
in court opinions. 2 It is therefore necessary to understand how this rationale
is used and what is lost from the analysis by relying solely on this justifica-
tion.
II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MORAL RIGHTS
The two justifications provided for the inclusion of moral rights in
American law are that the artist has a relationship to his work that is worthy
of protection and that art is culturally important and distinct from other
property. 53 However, the majority of scholars discussing VARA assume that
the primary purpose of moral rights is to protect the artist's relationship to
his work.54 This rationale partially justifies moral rights, but it is not the
sole, nor the most crucial, driving force behind them. The public also has an
interest in preserving works of art." Section II.A argues that the focus by
49. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (referencing the "arduous act of creation" artists
engage in).
50. Id. at 6 ("Artists in this country play a very important role in capturing the essence
of culture and recording it for future generations.... [I]t is paramount to the integrity of our
culture that we preserve the integrity of our artworks....").
51. See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES xiv (2010) (comparing the relationship between an
artist and his art to that of a parent and child); Redmond-Cooper, supra note 41, at 69 (noting
that moral rights "take account of the intimate, emotional involvement between an artist and
his or her creation").
52. E.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 611 (7th Cit. 1999) (noting that
"[a]n artist's professional and personal identity is embodied in each work" and "[e]ach work is
a form of personal expression" (citations omitted)); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 E3d 77,
81 (2d. Cir. 1995) (noting that "[t]he rights spring from a belief that an artist in the process of
creation injects his spirit into the work").
53. See supra Part I.
54. See, e.g., SIMON STOKES, ART & COPYRIGHT 65 (rev. ed. 2003) (claiming that moral
rights are based in the idea that "any author, whatever he creates, embodies some part of himself
in his works" and to "mistreat the work of art is to mistreat the artist"); Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 497 (1991)
(quoting JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS
145 (2d ed. 1987)) ("The primary justification for the protection of moral rights is the idea that
the work of art is an extension of the artist's personality, an expression of his innermost being. To
mistreat the work of art is to mistreat the artist, to invade his area of privacy, to impair his person-
ality."); Cambra E. Stem, Comment, A Matter of Life or Death: The Visual Artists Rights Act and
the Problem of Postmortem Moral Rights, 51 UCLA L. REV. 849, 859 (2004) ("One of the fun-
damental bases for the concept of moral rights in general is the sanctity of the personality that the
artist injects into the work that she creates.").
55. See infra Section 1f.B; see also W.R. Cornish, Authors in Law, 58 MOO. L. REV. 1,
9 (1995) ("[W]hat matters is not so much the claims of creative genius as the deep social,
cultural response to [the] actual work.").
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scholars and the courts on this justification is neither historically nor con-
ceptually accurate. Section II.B then argues that it is necessary to refocus
moral rights on the public's connection to artistic creations in order to pro-
duce more sensible outcomes under VARA.
A. The Connection of the Artist to His Work
The focus of moral rights scholars on the connection an artist feels to his
work allows for easier theoretical attacks on moral rights. Scholars frequent-
ly argue that moral rights express ideals of nineteenth-century Romantic Era
art production, such as the tragic artist pouring himself into his work.56 They
conclude that moral rights are outdated and irrelevant to society today.57 In
order to correct this misperception, it is necessary to develop a more
accurate understanding of the artist's relationship to his work.
The personal relationship an artist has with his creation is better under-
stood not as a reason to have moral rights, but as a defining feature of post-
Renaissance art. The production of art in the contemporary sense began
around 1400.58 The definition of art changed over the centuries that
followed, and the connection artists had to their work became increasingly
important to that definition.5 9 However, that connection did not necessarily
56. See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 271 (2009)
("[M]oral rights law is premised on a transitory, albeit deeply powerful notion of artistic au-
thorship: the romantic myth of the solo genius artist.").
57. E.g., id. at 265 (arguing that "moral rights law has become obsolete"). Additionally,
it is worth noting that in contrast to the claims constantly made by moral rights scholars, Ro-
mantic artists were not melancholics who poured themselves into their work. Instead, they
advocated an art that was not bound by rules and logic but was personal and expressive, with
only the artist himself able to judge what made art good or successful. See HUGH HONOUR,
ROMANTICISM 16 (1979) (stating that the Romantics "sought to express ideals which ... lay
beyond the bounds of logical discourse" with their "individual sensibility" being the "only
faculty of aesthetic judgment"). This was comparable to the emphasis on style that accompa-
nied the Renaissance, which was also a reaction to the rules-based notions of art production
that had come before. See UMBERTO Eco, ART AND BEAUTY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 93 (Hugh
Bredin trans., 1986) (explaining how Medieval art production was "not expression, but con-
struction, an operation aiming at a certain result").
58. See ARTHUR C. DANTO, AFTER THE END OF ART: CONTEMPORARY ART AND THE
PALE OF HISTORY 3 (1997) (arguing that prior to 1400 art was "not even thought of as ... having
been produced by artists," as "the artist did not enter into the explanation of devotional images");
see also HANS BELTING, LIKENESS AND PRESENCE: A HISTORY OF THE IMAGE BEFORE THE ERA
OF ART xxi-xxii (Edmund Jephcott trans., 1994) (arguing that after the Middle Ages art "became
acknowledged for its own sake" and prior to that it "had a social and cultural significance of an
altogether different kind").
59. Through the Middle Ages, artists were seen either as craftsmen who copied nature
or as actors inspired by divine forces. KWALL, supra note 51, at 1; see also DANTO, supra note
58, at 114 (noting that there was no "distinction .. . between art and craft"). In the Renais-
sance, artists were seen as separate from craftsmen, each artist creating works according to his
own style. MOSHE BARASCH, THEORIES OF ART: FROM PLATO TO WINCKELMANN 178 (1985).
This was the first time artists were seen as creative. See id. at 190. See generally ROBERT WIL-
LIAMS, ART, THEORY, AND CULTURE IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ITALY 16-18 (1997) (discussing
October 2011 ]
Michigan Law Review
mean that artists were creating the pieces themselves. Just as Biichel never
constructed any piece of the work that MASS MoCA commissioned, 60 Re-
naissance artists produced art through large workshops, often adding only
the finishing touches to the canvasses.61 An essential characteristic of art,
then, is the intent to make a work of art, not to execute it oneself.
6
An examination of VARA reveals that the protections offered by moral
rights in the United States are more focused on people who intend to make a
work of art than on the connection creators feel to what they have made. For
example, people who create works for hire may feel just as attached to their
creations as any other artist, but their works are not protected. 63 VARA is
drafted to protect pieces intended to be "pure" works of art. It does not cov-
er advertisements, works for hire, and a wide variety of other creative
endeavors.' These exclusions would not be logical if moral rights con-
cerned only the connection of a creator to his work. Therefore, there is
clearly a trait that art as art possesses that makes it worthy of receiving the
extra protection of moral rights. This factor is the public's interest in pre-
serving its culture through preserving art.
B. The Necessity of Public Access for Moral Rights
The great unanswered question of modem art theory is what makes
something a work of art.65 Unsurprisingly, courts attempt to avoid decisions
Vasari's concept of disegno (the term disegno literally means "drawing," but is used to refer to
an artist's capacity to imagine an entire work of art)).
60. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Bichel, 593 E3d 38, 44-46 (1 st
Cir. 2010).
61. See, e.g., DAVID BLAYNEY BROWN, ROMANTICISM 10 (2001) ("[T]he Renaissance
had incorporated a collective ideal...."); LARRY SHINER, THE INVENTION OF ART: A CUL-
TURAL HISTORY 6 (2001) (noting that making art was usually a cooperative affair during this
period, using Raphael's frescoes as an example).
62. This is especially true post-Duchamp, when readymades and found objects (where
the artist neither makes anything nor employs people to make anything, but finds an object and
chooses to display it) are accepted as art. The act of deciding something is art, and not creation
itself, is what matters. See, e.g., Steven Goldsmith, The Readymades of Marcel Duchamp: The
Ambiguities of an Aesthetic Revolution, 42 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 197, 197 (1983);
Helen Molesworth, Work Avoidance: The Everyday Life of Marcel Duchamp's Readymades,
ART J., Winter 1998, at 50, 51-52.
63. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (noting that "[a] work of visual art does not include.., any
work made for hire" and that "[a] 'work made for hire' is-a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment" or a work made for specific purposes, like for a
motion picture or as part of a collective work); see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d
77, 85-88 (2d. Cir. 1995) (determining that the work in question was not eligible for VARA
protection because it counted as a work for hire).
64. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Daniel McClean & Armen Avanessian, Trials of the Title: The Trials of
Brancusi and Veronese, in THE TRIALS OF ART 37, 46 (Daniel McClean ed., 2007) ("What is
art and what is not art is no longer obvious ...."); HAROLD ROSENBERG, THE DE-DEFINITION
OF ART 12 (2d prtg. 1983) ("Painting, sculpture, drama, music, have been undergoing a pro-
cess of de-definition. The nature of art has become uncertain."). See generally PAUL
CROWTHER, DEFINING ART, CREATING THE CANON: ARTISTIC VALUE IN AN ERA OF DOUBT
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that require them to answer this question.66 However, courts' reluctance to
say what art is results in them forgetting why society cares about it. Society
has an interest in protecting art and in treating it differently than other prop-
erty, since art is valued culturally. 67 When moral rights are dismissed as
simply concerning the artist's relationship with his work, this other rationale
is forgotten. However, the authorship aspect of creative works is essential,
for it is the public's relationship with art that justifies its protection. This
Section explains the relevance of authorship to moral rights and argues that
a work of art must therefore have a relationship to the public in order to re-
ceive the protection of moral rights.
At first, judges attempted to provide an objective answer to what made
something a work of art. For example, in Brancusi v. United States, Brancu-
si fought a 40 percent import tax levied by U.S. Customs officials against
his 1925 sculpture, Bird inflight.68 The main issue of the case was whether
the work counted as a sculpture-and was therefore exempted from the
tax-under Article 1704 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1922, or whether it instead
counted as a utilitarian object.6 9 The government was careful to argue that
the case was not one about personal taste in art, and each side called experts
to explain what made something a work of art.7° The case has come to be
(2007) (attempting to define what art is now); DANTO, supra note 58 (discussing art after the
"era of art"); STEPHEN DAVIES, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART (2006) (discussing theories of how
to define art and why people create it).
66. The courts instead tend to emphasize that they are avoiding issues of taste and look
to technicalities to say something isn't art, such as the work's being made for hire or its use as
an advertisement. See infra note 72. The focus is on defining art in terms of what it is not (the
exclusions listed) as opposed to what it is. JESSICA L. DARRABY, 1 ART, ARTIFACT, ARCHITEC-
TURE AND MUSEUM LAW § 9:9 (2010), available at ARTARCHLAW § 9.9 (Westlaw).
67. There are statutes outside of Title 17 that also articulate the value that art has to
society. See, e.g., National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities, 20 U.S.C. § 951(3)-(6)
(2006) ("An advanced civilization ... must give full value and support to the other great
branches of scholarly and cultural activity in order to achieve a better understanding of the
past, a better analysis of the present, and a better view of the future.... The arts and the hu-
manities reflect the high place accorded by the American people to the nation's rich cultural
heritage... ").
68. The 40 percent tax amounted to $240. Brancusi v. United States, 54 Treas. Dec.
Cust. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928); see also McClean & Avanessian, supra note 65, at 38-39.
69. See Brancusi, 54 Treas. Dec. Cust. at 430-41. The U.S. Customs officials classified
the work under "Kitchen Utensils and Hospital Supplied, one of the sub-categories of utilitari-
an artifacts listed under para. 399 of the Tariff Act (1922)" McClean & Avanessian, supra
note 65, at 59 n. 10. The Tariff Act defined paintings, sculptures, and statuary as:
Original paintings, in oil, mineral, water, or other colors, pastels, ... original sculptures
or statuary [in listed acceptable media] . .. but the terms "sculpture" and "statuary" as
used in this paragraph shall be understood to include professional productions of sculp-
tors only ... and the words "painting" and "sculpture" and "statuary" as used in this
paragraph shall not be understood to include any articles of utility, nor such as are made
wholly or in part by stenciling or any other mechanical process.
Tariff Act of 1922 $ 1704, 1 F. STAT. ANN. SUPP. 1922 (1923) (repealed 1930).
70. Thierry de Duve, Bird, Fish or Flying Tiger: What's In a Name?, in THE TRIALS
OF ART, supra note 65, at 89, 89-90 (recounting that Brancusi's experts were a sculptor, the
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viewed as a somewhat "comical" moment in legal history,71 and since
Brancusi, courts have generally been deferential to the question of what
makes something art. Instead, they tend to look to whether the work can
be copyrighted or to other purposes of the work to decide whether VARA
protections apply.
7 2
VARA, like the Tariff Act at issue in Brancusi, provides little guidance
as to what specifically makes something a work of art.73 However, the fail-
ure of the text of VARA and the courts to provide a definition of art has
resulted in no acknowledgement that, fundamentally, all art is characterized
by the relationship it has to the public. 74 It is not a coincidence that moral
rights emerged conceptually at the same time that the importance of art to
society was being articulated .7  For instance, the nineteenth century gave
rise to the idea that art's cultural value meant that it was to be treated differ-
ently from other kinds of property.76 Moral rights, which are the strongest in
director of the Brooklyn Museum, and three art critics while the United States called two
professional sculptors).
71. The comedy arose from the long debate among the experts in the case over whether
the title bore any relation to what the sculpture represented and from the government's posi-
tion that this lack of relation meant that the work was not a sculpture at all. See McClean &
Avanessian, supra note 65, at 38.
72. See, e.g., Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 173d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2010) (de-
termining that an art car was promotional and therefore not entitled to VARA protections);
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04-C-07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *13-14 (N.D. I11. Sept. 29,
2008) (determining that Kelley's flower arrangements could be considered either a painting or
a sculpture, but that they were not copyrightable and therefore not entitled to VARA protec-
tions), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011) (disagreeing with the thought
that Kelley's work counted as a painting or a sculpture at all and noting that "a living garden
lacks the kind of authorship and stable fixation normally required to support copyright").
73. The Committee Report on the enactment of VARA states:
The courts should use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic
community in determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of the defini-
tion. Artists may work in a variety of media, and use any number of materials in creating
their works. Therefore, whether a particular work falls within the definition should not
depend on the medium or materials used.
H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921; accord
Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 526, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (de-
termining that even a clay model designed to become a larger sculpture can count as a visual
artwork).
74. Many definitions of art, attempting to capture contemporary art, use the idea of a
public unveiling as their sole criteria. See CROWTHER, supra note 65, at 21 (noting one defini-
tion of art as "an evaluable artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public").
75. Arguably this process began during the Renaissance, when treatises on art theory
were first presented to the public; by the end of the sixteenth century, authors were aware that
art was produced for a public that would interact with artists' works as art in relation to other
art. BARAsCH, supra note 59, at 206; see also BELTING, supra note 58, at 471 ("[T]he new
image required an understanding of art."); id. at 552 (noting that in the Renaissance, "judg-
ments on [art] passed to the art connoisseur").
76. See Andrew Causey, Eden v. Whistler: The Baronet and the Butterfly, in THE TRI-
ALS OF ART, supra note 65, at 151, 156 ("[T]here has been [since the nineteenth century] a
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France, Germany, and Italy,77 emerged while these countries "were placing a
high value on the role of art within a distinct cultural identity."7 s Underlying
these rights is the idea that "[a]n artist's work benefits a larger community"
and that "It]here is a public interest in preserving and protecting art
works."79 As John Merryman eloquently pointed out in an article arguing for
enactment of moral rights legislation pre-VARA:
[T]he interests of individual artists and viewers are only part of the story.
Art is an aspect of our present culture and our history; it helps tell us who
we are and where we came from. To revise, censor, or improve the work of
art is to falsify a piece of the culture. We are interested in protecting the
work of art for public reasons, and the moral right of the artist is in part a
method of providing for private enforcement of this public interest.
80
The idea of art as part of a culture's definition is neither novel nor out-
dated. For instance, in 1878, in a payment dispute about a painting (three
years in the making) of a room commissioned for a family home in Lon-
don,81 painter James McNeil Whistler declared "I do not acknowledge that a
picture once bought belongs merely to the man who pays the money, but
that it is really the property of the whole world. '82 More recently, in 1986,
an Australian newspaper ran an advertisement for the sale of a Picasso paint-
ing.8 3 The work, Trois Femmes, was to be cut up into 500 one-inch squares
and sold square by square in individual frames.84 This naturally "horriffied]
the art world"85 and violated a collective sense of what it meant to own a
piece of art.8 6 Even in the literary context, looking at a recent discussion of
widely held belief that... the principles underlying the ownership and exchange of art cannot
be the same as those governing the exchange of manufactured goods.").
77. Rikki Sapolich, When Less Isn't More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral Rights
Model of Copyright Through a Study of Minimalist Art, 47 IDEA 453,455 (2007).
78. Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 407,
417 (2009).
79. Natalia Thurston, Buyer Beware: The Unexpected Consequences of the Visual Art-
ists Rights Act, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 701, 703 (2005).
80. Merryman, supra note 41, at 1041; see also Bird, supra note 78, at 426 (noting that
moral rights "guard the non-morally embedded public interest in preserving artistic intention
and cultural heritage").
81. Causey, supra note 76, at 155-56.
82. STANLEY WEINTRAUB, WHISTLER: A BIOGRAPHY 185 (1974). Whistler similarly
wrote on another occasion that "people imagine that just because they've paid £200 for a pic-
ture, it becomes their property. Absurd!" Id. at 407.
83. Bird, supra note 78, at 408.
84. Id.
85. Id. This was one of the events discussed when the United States enacted moral
rights legislation, and Edward J. Markey of the House of Representatives mentioned it in his
introduction of the proposed VARA in 1989. 135 CONG. REC. 12,622 (1989).
86. Private ownership of art is not seen as the right to treat works however one sees fit.
See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
IN CULTURAL TREASURES 68-72 (1999) (arguing that there are, in essence, two interests: that
of the owner to do what he wishes with a painting, and that of the public at large in preserving
the work for the future); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 791
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the works of Kafka-whose works were published in spite of his orders that
they all be burned at his death-one sees the argument that their publication
was warranted because they "weren't ... Kafka's private property but, ra-
ther, belonged to humanity[.]"
's7
Art's value to society has implications for its definition. If art is special
and worth treating differently than other property, it is because of the unique
meaning given to it by the public.88 For the work to matter, there must,
therefore, be a relationship between the work of art and the public. 89 There
can be no cultural connection to art, no reason to treat it differently, if it is
kept from public view. A work of art is "[]produced only where it is
[]communicated."90 It remains irrelevant whether the work was sent into
society because the artist decided it was time or whether it only appeared on
the public stage after the death of the artist, as in the case of Kafka. It
matters only that there is a moment of public entry. 91 However, as discussed
in Part III, the courts, such as the First Circuit in Biichel, do not factor the
interest of the public into their decisions involving moral rights.
III. VARA PROTECTIONS SHOULD VEST AT THE
MOMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
This Part argues that in order for VARA to properly reflect legislative in-
tent and to remain consistent with prior judicial decisions, courts should
recognize moral rights as vesting when an artist publicly discloses his work,
(2005) ("[A]n art collector does not exactly own a valuable painting that hangs in her living
room. Rather, she is the work's steward.").
87. Elif Batuman, Kafka's Last Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at MM34, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/magazine/26kafka-t.htm? ?-r=4&hpw.
88. The public also has a role in defining art in the first place. See DANTO, supra note
58, at 198 ("There is a difference ... between the forms and the way we relate to them....
The way we relate to those forms is part of what defines our period."); Rudi Laermans, De-
constructing Individual Authorship: Artworks as Collective Products of Art Worlds, in ART &
LAW, supra note 21, at 50, 58-59 ("A work is never an artwork in itself, but is categorised or
labelled as such in light of specific conventions or standards" that are determined by "a com-
munity ... with a 'collective consciousness' or culture, a shared set of categories and
definitions." This "act of categorizing is by definition an interpretation... "').
89. This is a notion our culture understands. For example, the author of The Hours,
Michael Cunningham, recently wrote in the New York Times:
I teach writing, and one of the first questions I ask my students every semester is, who
are you writing for? The answer, 9 times out of 10, is that they write for themselves. I tell
them that I understand-that I go home every night, make an elaborate cake and eat it all
by myself. By which I mean that cakes, and books, are meant to be presented to others.
And further, that books (unlike cakes) are deep, elaborate interactions between writers
and readers, albeit separated by time and space.
Michael Cunningham, Op-Ed., Found in Translation, N.Y IMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at WK10.
90. Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of Copy-
right Vis-a-vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 203 (2008); see also id.
at 200 (arguing that copyright generally is "less an exclusive right of reproduction than an
exclusive right of public presentation").
91. See infra Part III for a discussion on what counts as public disclosure.
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not when the work is "created" under the Copyright Act. Courts can also
reach more consistent and logically predictable results using disclosure as
the vesting point for moral rights. Moreover, a disclosure standard recogniz-
es that it is necessary for a work of art to be presented to the public in order
for the work to be culturally relevant and therefore worthy of protections
that are not given to other types of property. The artist should be entitled to
decide when this moment of public disclosure is to occur. As Serra's assis-
tants explained, the pieces of steel sitting in Port Morris are not a work of
art until Serra decides that they are.92 Serra's decision, like any artist's, is
what allows his creation to be recognized as art; it is his choice alone to
make.
This Part does not propose adding a right of disclosure, like the French
moral rights system has.93 Instead, it proposes that disclosure be used as the
vesting point for the other moral rights in VARA. 94 This Part therefore uses
the term "disclosure" to refer to the point at which VARA protections vest,
not to signify an independent right under VARA. There are two ways for a
work to be disclosed, only one of which allows for a claim under VARA.95
First, an artist could make a conscious decision that his work was complete
and display it to the public. In these cases, a standard comparable to the
Copyright Act's definition of "display" would be suitable. The Act states
that displaying a work publicly is to "display it at a place open to the public
or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances [are] gathered." 96 Second, an
artist could die and the works could then be presented to the public. VARA
protections last only for the life of the artist,97 so any work he thought was
incomplete could be shown to the public upon his death.
92. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
93. See CODE DE LA PROPRIETt INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE]
art. L. 121-2 (Pierre Sirinelli et a]. eds., 9th ed. 2009) (Fr.) [hereinafter C. PROP. INT.].
94. The distinction between making disclosure the moment when VARA rights vest and
adding disclosure as a right in itself is critical. To add a disclosure fight is simply to give art-
ists another right, but says nothing about the question at issue in this Note of when moral
fights protections begin. Adding a disclosure right would also not change the outcome of
Biichel, as Biichel would have claimed the right and prevailed over Mass MoCA.
95. Only the creator can bring suit under VARA, so there is no one who can bring a
claim under VARA when a deceased artist's works are presented to the public. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(b) (2006).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). For an example of a recent disclosure, see Jasper Rees,
Street Art Way Below the Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010 (discussing an unused subway
platform decorated by a series of graffiti artists and shown to a photographer and a reporter).
These works of graffiti, however, would not be covered by VARA because they are placed
illegally. See English v. BFC & R E. 11 th St. LLC, No. 97-cv-7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
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A. Disclosure Is Consistent with the Purpose and Text of VARA
This Section argues that utilizing disclosure as the vesting point for pro-
tection under VARA is sensible conceptually. First, it is consistent with the
overall text of VARA and its stated interest in protecting the dignity of the
artist. Second, it reflects the underlying interest of the public in preserving
artworks. Third, it incorporates the legislative interest in preserving culture
that motivated the passage of VARA.
VARA, which is framed in terms of the artist's rights in his work,98 can
easily accommodate disclosure conceptually. Integrity and attribution are
concerned with the reputation of the artist, with a work "literally and figura-
tively" having "the artist's signature on it."99 By "allowing artists to
determine when a work.., should be released to the public, [artists are giv-
en] full control over dissemination of their work" and, accordingly, their
reputations.1i0 Disclosure protects the dignity of the artist by respecting the
"signature and presentation" of the author's choosing,' 01 and the right of the
artist to disclose must be personal and discretionary.
1 2
The requirement of disclosure, however, adds more to VARA than an-
other personal right-it more accurately reflects society's interest in art and
the fact that art does not exist without a public. The "completion of [a] work
involves some act of ... public authorization"; art must be "perceptible."' 03
The choice to disclose is personal, in that it is the artist's choice to do so (as
with all other rights under VARA, where only the artist himself is entitled to
98. Cf C. PROP. INT., supra note 93, at art. L. 121-3 (noting that the French right of
disclosure, by contrast, can be exercised by the courts and the minister of culture in the case of
"notorious abuses" ("d'abus notoire") in the exercise or nonexercise of the right by the artist
or his descendants or heirs); SAX, supra note 86, at 26 (arguing that U.S. moral fights are
"unmistakably focused on the fights of the artist").
99. Holst, supra note 42, at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 113; see also Liemer, supra note 23, at 42-43 (discussing the vulnerability
artists feel at the moment of disclosure and arguing that moral rights should protect artists
from the harm of a forced exposure).
101. KWALL, supra note 51, at 5.
102. In this sense, the rule would resemble the French right of disclosure. C. PROP. INT.,
supra note 93, at art. L. 121-2. Similarly, an artist should be entitled to decide when to dis-
close his work regardless of whether "the work and all pecuniary rights in it are owned by the
transferee" FELDMAN, supra note 27, at 454. This premise was tested in France by the case of
Whistler v. Eden, where the court ruled that Whistler did not have to turn over a painting
bought and paid for against his will, as discussed in Part II. For further analysis of the Whis-
tler case, see id. at 451-52 and Causey, supra note 76, passim.
103. DAvIES, supra note 65, at 83; see also supra Section II.B.
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bring an action'l'). Still, the disclosure prong recognizes the relationship
that art and artists have to the public.'15
The Committee Report on the enactment of VARA focuses on society's
relationship to art as well, further supporting a disclosure standard. At
VARA's passage, Robert Kastenmeier noted that while the first goal of
VARA was to "protect the honor and reputation of visual artists," the second
goal was "to protect the works of art themselves" because "society is the
ultimate loser when these works are modified or destroyed."'16 Senator Ken-
nedy argued that VARA was necessary to "safeguard the Nation's artistic
heritage,"'1 7 and Senator Markey claimed that in order to "captur[e] the es-
sence of [our] culture" it is necessary "to preserve the integrity of our
artworks."'18 The Committee Report similarly states that the arts are "an
integral element of our civilization;" they are "fundamental to our national
character and are among the greatest of our national treasures."'0 9 It further
argues that the public is "cheat[ed] ... of an accurate account of the culture
of our time" when works are altered or destroyed."I0
B. Disclosure Avoids the Problems of a "Creation" Standard
A disclosure standard would resolve several problems that are created by
the First Circuit's decision in Biichel to use "creation" as the standard for
when VARA protections vest. As an initial point, this Section notes that
there is no other case decided by the courts in which creation alone was suf-
ficient for moral rights to apply. Next, this Section argues that a creation
standard would oblige courts to apply one set of criteria to finished works
and another to pieces in progress. Additionally, a creation standard makes
it extremely difficult to determine when an integrity violation has actually
104. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b), (e); cf CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1) (West Supp. 2010) (ex-
tending the rights to the artist's heirs or personal representative for fifty years after the death
of the artist); C. PROP. INT., supra note 93, at art. L. 121-2-3 (giving, in order, the creator's
executors, descendants, spouse, heirs, and the minister of culture the right to enforce the moral
rights).
105. This reincorporation of the public into intellectual property law is a growing trend,
and recognizes that creative works are valuable because of the public's relationship to them.
See, e.g., ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 1 (2010) (noting that copyright is concerned with balancing the access of
authors to commercial benefits with the fact that literary works benefit the public); Drassinow-
er, supra note 90, at 200 (criticizing the judiciary for their "infrequent" affirmation "of the
centrality of users" in copyright cases); Jens Schovsbo, How to Get it Copy-Right?, in ART
AND LAW: THE COPYRIGHT DEBATE 25, 29-30 (Morten Rosenmeier & Stina Teilmann eds.,
2005) (arguing for users' rights to again be balanced with the rights of creators).
106. 136 CONG. REC. 12,608 (1990).
107. 135 CONG. REC. 12,250 (1989).
108. Id. at 12,622.
109. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6916-
17.
110. Id. at 6.
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occurred. Finally, the societal interests in preserving art do not apply to un-
finished pieces that have yet to be presented to the public.
First, it is important to note that the act of "creation" has never been de-
terminative in any other VARA case. Rather, that is only the starting point of
the analysis. For instance, the unfinished work in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc. was "created" under the Copyright Act, but it was not covered by
VARA because it was a work for hire."1 Other works have been "created"
but are unprotected by VARA because they were placed illegally1 12 or used
as advertisements. 113 Artists who have challenged the destruction of their
works must also present a case that their works possessed sufficient stature
within the artistic community.11 4 It is not enough that their works were
merely "created." Bichel is the only case in which creation itself was suffi-
cient for moral rights to apply.
Second, applying moral rights to works that are "created" but not yet
disclosed creates a dual regime-an approach specifically rejected in the
past-under which disclosed and undisclosed works have to be treated
differently by the courts." 5 A dual regime is created by the extension of
VARA protection to unfinished works because what a work will be and what
purpose it will serve cannot necessarily be determined when a work is in-
complete. Courts will have no way of knowing with complete certainty what
form the final creation will take, and could easily end up granting VARA
protection to a work that, when completed, would not be entitled to it. A
disclosure standard resolves this uncertainty by presenting courts only with
completed works, at which point the decision as to whether the piece is a
work of art or falls within one of VARA's exceptions will be clear.
VARA is a limited statute, designed to apply only to works of visual art.
It is not enough for a court to be able to decide that a work, when
completed, will have some artistic value. For instance, artworks created as
advertisements are excluded from VARA." 6 As the Second Circuit pointed
out in Pollara v. Seymour, such materials are excluded "regardless of
whether.., the work being used to promote or advertise might otherwise be
111. 71 E3d 77, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995).
112. English v. BFC & R E. 11 th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997).
113. Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 E3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2010).
114. Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2006); see
also, e.g., Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D.N.Y 2004) (determining that it is not
enough for the artist to have recognition from the artistic community-the work in question
must also have artistic recognition).
115. For example, in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., Phillips argued that a dual
regime should exist under VARA, with one standard for site-specific art and another for all
other works of visual art. 459 F.3d 128, 141-43 (1st Cir. 2006). The First Circuit rejected the
proposed creation of two standards and also noted that Phillips's proposal "could dramatically
affect real property interests and laws." Id. The extension of VARA protections to unfinished
works both creates a dual regime and implicates property concerns similar to those presented
in Phillips.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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called a painting, drawing, or sculpture.""' 7 In other words, determining
whether a work will be a painting, drawing, or sculpture upon its completion
does not finish the inquiry. It is also necessary to look at what purpose the
piece will serve, and a court cannot always accurately assess the ultimate
purpose and function of unfinished works.
Similarly, in Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, the Fifth Circuit conclud-
ed that because the work of art at issue was made for primarily promotional
purposes, VARA protections did not apply.' The work in that case was a
car that had been smashed and turned into a cactus planter. 1 9 Had such a
work been placed in a museum or gallery, it would easily have qualified as a
sculpture. However, it was positioned outside of Kleinman's store, and the
court determined that it was an advertisement excluded from VARA protec-
tions.'2 0 The location and use of items are necessary elements in a court's
determination of whether they count as works of art under VARA. If the
work was unfinished at the time of the suit, Kleinman could have claimed it
was a work of art; there would have been no way to contradict her, as there
would have been no method to ascertain the eventual purpose that the work
would serve. This situation suggests the beginning of a dual regime in which
a work that is unfinished receives more VARA protections because of the
uncertainty concerning its ultimate purpose and location.
The difficulty that courts would face with such a standard is especially
clear in the case of photography. In order for a photograph to be considered
a work of visual art, it must be produced for exhibition purposes and must
exist either as "a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edi-
tion of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by
the author."' 2 1 The purpose and the number of copies made and whether they
are signed and numbered are all elements that can only be determined from
completed photographs. A photograph can be "created" before it is num-
bered and signed and sent to a gallery, especially because negatives count as
photographs for purposes of VARA.' 22 Courts would be left to assume the
eventual purpose and the number of copies that will be made when dealing
with negatives or photographs that are "created" but not yet disclosed. In
fact, a recent case concerning whether photographs were produced for exhi-
bition purposes specifically rejected using the intent of the artist at the time
of "creation" to determine whether VARA protection applied.
123
Extending the protection of moral rights to unfinished works also raises
the problem of determining when a violation under VARA has actually oc-
cuffed. What does it mean to say that a change violated the integrity of a
117. 344 F3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 2003).
118. 597 F3dat329.
119. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 324.
120. Id. at 329.
121. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
122. For a thorough discussion of why negatives count as photographs for moral rights
purposes, see Lilley v. Stout, 384 E Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2005).
123. Id. at 87-89.
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work when the piece is not yet complete and the change can be undone? For
instance, in Biichel, the work was made by MASS MoCA under Biichel's
instructions.124 He never actually did any work of his own on the piece. The
court found that the museum violated his integrity rights through their "en-
croach[ment] on his artistic vision by making modifications to the installation
that in some instances were directly contrary to his instructions."'1 25 However,
it appears from the record that many of those modifications could have been
rectified. 12 6 In the case of collaborative works, it is likely that changes and
modifications will be made throughout, for instance when the artist realizes
that he has not adequately explained part of the work to the people actually
making it. It is unclear from Biichel when rectifiable errors in construction
would become integrity violations.
Finally, the application of VARA to unfinished works presents the risk of
altering property norms, a concern raised by courts handling moral rights
cases involving site-specific art.'27 Protections given to art already alter
property norms, but society has decided that it is worth intruding on tradi-
tional notions of ownership in order to preserve culturally valuable art.28
For example, a person can buy a table and cut it in half, but cannot do the
same to a work of visual art because society as a whole suffers the loss and
has decided that it is worth intruding on traditional property rights in the
name of preservation. Unfinished works alter property rights, but without
the justifications that accompany finished works. Society's interest in a work
that has not been publicly disclosed is greatly reduced, if not nonexistent,
and so it does not make sense to offer such works the same protections as
disclosed works of art. Meanwhile, protecting unfinished works with moral
rights has potentially dramatic consequences for property holders. There is
nothing to stop an artist from doing minimal work on a project sufficient to
meet the "creation" standard and then abandoning the work, leaving a gal-
lery owner unsure if he can then make any alterations to the space. An artist
could hold a museum or gallery hostage, demanding changes under the
threat of suit, continually increasing the budget, as in Biichel, and holding
up the space by refusing to move the work.
Therefore, it is much simpler to say that a work is not finished until it is
disclosed, and until it is disclosed an artist cannot sue for VARA violations.
No dual regime is thereby created, because the purpose of a work can be
fully ascertained. Requiring artists to disclose their works also recognizes
that the reason why art is valued is that the public has an interaction with it.
124. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Btichel, 593 F.3d 38, 44 (1st
Cir. 2010).
125. Jd. at57-61.
126. See id. at 45 (noting that, in fact, "numerous components of the installation [were]
reworked to Btichel's specifications" when he visited the museum to check on the progress of
the installation).
127. See, e.g., Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 142 (1st Cir. 2006);
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04 C 07715, 2008 WL 4449886, at *6 (N.D. I11. Sept. 29, 2008),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing Phillips).
128. See supra note 86.
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A work should, of course, be entitled to copyright protections from the time
it is "created," but economic protections of copyright are not the same as the
moral protections of VARA. As Serra wrote after the destruction of his work
Tilted Arc, 129 moral rights "are independent from the work as property and
... any pecuniary interest in the work" and acknowledge that "art can be
something other than a mere commercial product." 3 ° From the time moral
rights were articulated, they have been seen as separate from an artist's eco-
nomic interest in his work."' "Creation" is the appropriate standard for
when economic rights should apply, but disclosure is a better standard for
when moral rights should. Disclosure acknowledges that art is only valuable
at the point when it becomes a work of art. Without a public there is no art.
CONCLUSION
There is no objective method for determining when a work of art is fin-
ished. Serra finished physically constructing his work, but claims it is not
yet a work of art. Many of the great works in museums were considered
incomplete by their creators and never meant to be shown to the world.
While an artist is living, only he can decide when a work is complete and
ready to be viewed by the public. The ability to decide when a work is
viewable protects the reputation of the artist and gives him control over his
works. The public also knows that they are seeing the work as the artist in-
tended.
Biichel was incorrectly decided, because the work remained undisclosed
at the time of trial. Therefore, Biichel should not have had any moral rights
claims over his work. Using "creation" instead of disclosure as the vesting
point for moral rights has the potential to create unmanageable and illogical
results under VARA. Two standards would be created, one for finished
works and one for unfinished works. The courts would be forced to specu-
late about the eventual purpose the work would be put to and, in particular,
would run into problems with undisclosed photographs. Finally, it would be
entirely unclear when an integrity violation actually took place. Instead of
being subjected to such a dual standard, then, artists should be required to
disclose their works to receive the protections of moral rights.
When an artist discloses a work of visual art, he is also identifying the
work as a piece of art and presenting it to the public with that label. Only
129. See Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988); Christina
Michalos, Murdering Art: Destruction of Art Works and Artists' Moral Rights, in THE TRIALS
OF ART, supra note 65, at 173, 179-82 (discussing Serra's losing legal battle in 1986 to stop
the removal of his site-specific piece Tilted Arc from the Federal Plaza in New York, where
Serra argued that "[t]o remove the work would be to destroy the work"); see also Judith Bres-
ler, Serra v. USA and its Aftermath: Mandate for Moral Rights in America?, in THE TRIALS OF
ART, supra note 65, at 195, 195-200 (discussing the procedural history of Serra's claim and
how Tilted Arc was dismantled and put into storage fifteen days after the Berne Convention
Implementation Act).
130. Richard Serra, Art and Censorship, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 574, 576 (1991).
131. See supra Part 1.
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when art is shown to the public does it becomes something more than a pri-
vate and personal creation. Therefore, the point of disclosure is the
appropriate time for a work to be covered by moral rights. Having moral
rights vest at this time also more accurately reflects VARA's legislative in-
tent, the history of moral rights, and the underlying societal interest in
protecting art. Additionally, the courts can reach more logically coherent
and predictable outcomes by utilizing a disclosure standard. Therefore, art-
ists should be required to disclose their works in order to qualify for
protection under VARA.
